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Abstract—Fifth Generation (5G) wireless technology is usher-
ing in a new age of interconnectivity, and as it does definitions
of privacy may well change with it. In this paper we will focus
on the changing nature of location privacy, while aspiring to
increase community cognizance of vulnerabilities within the 5G
network that threaten end-user privacy. To this end, we will ad-
dress the statistical efficacy of a multilateration attack utilizing
timing advance commands within the 5G cloud radio access
network, by showcasing that such an attack meets the Cramér-
Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) across each subcarrier spacing.
We will also demonstrate how position estimates within 5G
can be further refined using methods previously shown to
be effective in Long-Term Evolution (LTE) Networks. Lastly,
we will demonstrate the attack in a simulated environment
modeled after the conference grounds, using current real-world
deployments of 5G on Kauai.
1. Introduction
Privacy is a fundamental part of any society. It is in-
extricably woven into the fabric of our everyday lives, to
the point of expectation, which when not met, is often seen
as an egregious violation of a most basic right. That being
the case, we must ask ourselves, how is privacy defined?
To date, there have been numerous definitions of privacy,
with societies and in fact individuals, often reevaluating
what privacy means to them. In one of the first significant
and influential works on consumer data privacy and data
protection [1], Professor Alan Westin, asserts this definition:
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.
The above is readily applied to location privacy and sets a
framework for the discussion of why it is changing, how it
is threatened, and inspires the most important question, one
which we will answer in due time; ”Who cares?”
1.1. The Capricious Nature of Privacy
Each individual’s perspective on what should remain
private is influenced by their own internal beliefs, as well
as extrinsic pressure from the societal norm, which shifts
with time and location. What today seems normal to share
about yourself, may have been, or more likely was indeed,
entirely anathema 100 years ago.
1.1.1. The Why. The digital age has brought on an entirely
unprecedented and almost dogmatic change in when, how,
and what we share about ourselves. Social media, location
based services (LBS), targeted advertisements, data/internet
usage tracking, have all whittled away at the idealization
of ”private-life” vs ”public-life” that the two seem inter-
changeable. This will only become more blurred as the
Internet of Things (IoT) comes into full swing with multi-
billion increases in number of connected devices per year
(see Figure 1), that with the promise of 5G, device-to-device
(D2D) communication, and access points on every corner,
will be streaming a near constant supply of information
about end users.
Figure 1: Projection of number of connected devices through
2023 [2].





1.1.2. The How. For location privacy, this is especially true.
As the prevalence and precision of location-aware devices
increases, an end user’s privacy concerning their location
decreases. This may seem an almost trivial statement, as
there has been a long-held generalization that the utility
provided by LBS, across the realms of safety (enhanced-
911 (E-911) calls), commerce (store advertisements based
on location), fitness (distance/route tracking), transportation
(route selection/habit tracking), etc, outweighs this loss in
privacy. However, we will show that by the nature of the 5G
protocol and network architecture, end user location data is
at risk to anyone, with a relatively small amount of technical
acumen and resources at their disposal.
1.2. Previous Work
Localization of user equipment (UE) as a requirement
was first codified in the 1996 Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) mandate for standardized accuracy require-
ments for E-911 calls [3]. These requirements have been
revised a multitude of times with accuracy requirements
becoming more precise with each iteration, resulting in far
reaching effects on the use of users’ location data, and
setting the pace for industry.
Rosado et al identify the five fundamental positioning
techniques utilizing radio signals as trilateration, triangula-
tion, proximity, scene-analysis, and hybrid [4]. We will focus
entirely on trilateration, or more generally, multilateration.
Multilateration is a technique where a UE position solution
is calculated based on the intersection of common geometric
constructs based on distance measurements between the UE
and reference transmitter/receiver (time of arrival (ToA),
received signal strength (RSS), angle of arrival (AoA), etc).
Figure 2 displays this localization technique succinctly. To
meet regulatory requirements, large sums of research have
been conducted on mobile and network based trilateration
techniques that have shown these techniques to be a valid
method for achieving the aforementioned requirements [5].
1.3. Novel contributions
This paper will focus on addressing the statistical ef-
ficiency of a multilateration technique utilizing inherent
timing management controls across the fresh numerologies
present in the 5G protocol. We will also demonstrate the
effectiveness of an enhancement algorithm to increase posi-
tion fidelity and showcase a simulated attack on a conference
attendee.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we will cover an overview of the Cloud Radio
Access Network (CRAN) architecture, sub-carrier spacing
(SCS)s, and timing advance (TA) command. In Section 3
we discuss our proposed attack framework. In Section 4 we
will discuss the CRLB, and show a comparative analysis
of the CRLB across each SCS and position accuracy utiliz-
ing Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement (CeSAR).
In Section 5 we exhibit our simulated implementation on
Kauai, following up with an exploration of mitigation tech-
niques in Section 6. We present our closing remarks in
Section 7.
2. Foundations
Here follows a baseline introduction to key concepts
leveraged in this research.
2.1. The Cloud Radio Access Network
In order to meet the demanding aspirations of 5G, it
was determined that the classical network architecture and
protocols must be overhauled, thus the CRAN architecture
was designed. The varied divergences from the established
design can be grouped into two predominant categories of
physical restructuring of the network and interface updates.
The physical scheme of the network, detailed in Fig-
ure 3, is composed of a grouping of centrally located base-
band unit (BBU)s, in what is known as a ”BBU pool”, and
their associated remote radio head (RRH)s. Each pool is sta-
tioned in its servicing geographic region, and connected via
a fronthaul network to numerous RRHs densely distributed
close to UEs. For this study we assume a standard fiber
deployment, though there have been other physical layer
proposals [6]. This is in stark contrast to the traditional LTE
framework, where the BBU and RRH would be deployed
together as the singular base station.
Interface updates are required as the legacy common
public radio interface (CPRI), an industry cooperation used
in LTE [7], would necessitate a substantial increase in the
capacity required to maintain the proposed data rates. It
Figure 2: Example of trilateration in a wireless network.
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Figure 3: Example of C-RAN Architecture with physical layer splits identified.
would also eliminate the ability for network capacity to be
scaled based on real-time traffic volume, as the capacity
requirements would have to be fixed, reducing network effi-
ciency, and missing a notable mark for 5G. New interfaces
are being designed by the major industry leaders (Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 5G Infrastructure Public-Private
Partnership (5GPP)) and others to address the above issues.
The CPRI group’s response is the enhanced CPRI (eCPRI).
How these interfaces work to find a balance between latency,
efficiency, and customizability is founded on the concept
of functionally splitting the physical layer protocols. The
physical layer split (PLS) architecture, as defined by 3GPP,
[8] gives numerous options for network engineers to decide
how they want to divvy out responsibilities between the
BBU and RRH. For this paper we will assume that our
target network is operating using eCPRI with an option 7/2
fronthaul/backhaul, wherein the BBU maintains all radio
link control and media access control layer functions, while
lower physical layer functions, such as modulation and fast
Fourier transforms are delegated to the RRH [9]. This results
in the BBU conducting the majority of the digital baseband
radio functions, while the RRH carries out mostly analog
radio frequency tasks, which allows for the cost effective
spatial separation desired [6].
2.2. Numerologies
To enable a highly flexible network, 5G New Radio (NR)
established multiple numerologies µ, defined by the specific
SCS [10]. The SCSs are defined as
SCS = 15 × 2µ kHz for µ ∈ [0,4]. (1)
Therefore, supporting a range of 15 (standard LTE) to 240
kHz, where higher SCS realizes the increased bandwidth and
a shorter transmission time interval required for mmWave
(carrier frequency bands above 24 GHz) and delay sensitive
services, while lower is optimal for high physical layer
throughput [11]. Other than the primary intended effects
described above, the alteration of the SCS and Cyclic Prefix
(CP) for each numerology provides an ancillary service in
terms of localization via an exploitation of timing manage-
ment in 5G.
2.3. NR Timing Advance Command
The LTE TA command is made up of two notable parts,
the timing advance value NTA and the Timing Advance
Group (TAG) [12]. Its purpose is to ensure that as a UE
moves within the serviceable environment, its transmis-
sions arrive at the RRH during its given time slot. As the
UE moves, the propagation time for its transmissions will
change, significantly at times, requiring for some method of
synchronization.
The TAG, is a 2-bit field that allows unique association
of a TA command to a particular RRH (maximum of 4)
specifically to account for communication with multiple
RRHs, through carrier aggregation [13] and the high un-
likelihood that they are equidistant from the UE. NTA has
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Figure 4: Visual representation of a TA command with TA
= 2 and the associated distances with µ = 0.
an associated fixed time value due to LTE’s static basic time





15 × 103 × 2048 ≈ 32.6 nsec (2)
where ∆fref is the LTE SCS and Nf,ref the maximum
number of subcarriers. A singular TA value, represented as
an integer, accounts for 16 slot times such that
NTA = 16Ts. (3)
Utilizing equations (2) and (3) the one-way distance reso-
lution can be calculated as shown
r = cNTA
2
= 78.125 meters. (4)
In employing the NR numerologies a new base unit of time





480 × 103 × 4096 ≈ .51 nsec (5)
where ∆fmax is the maximum SCS and Nf the maximum
number of subcarriers. The relationship between Tc and Ts









15 × 103 × 2µ × 2048 (7)











Therefore, making use of equations (4) and (9), the new






evincing the dependence of 5G TA distance resolutions on
the associated numerology. Table 1 summarizes the new
resolutions while Figure 4 grants a visual understanding of
the TA.
TABLE 1: 5G NR Numerology Distance Resolutions






2.4. Statistical Efficiency of an Estimator
One of the main goals of this investigation, is to show
that our method for finding a maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE) utilizing TAs is statistically sound. To achieve this
we consider a well-established bound for the minimum
variance of a parameter estimate; the CRLB [15]. The bound
is defined as
Varθ{T} ≥ I−1(θ) (11)
where T is an unbiased estimator of the parameter θ and
I(θ) is the Fisher information with respect to θ. The CRLB’s
applicability in LTE TA localization has been shown ex-
tensively in [16], where the unbiased estimator is the UE
position MLE and the parameter to be estimated is the true
position. The authors also show that for each TA distance
resolution, r, the root mean square error (RMSE) is bounded
above the CRLB for r . 3.4σ, where σ is a measure of
variation within the position estimates. Our work extends
this to 5G NR and the novel numerologies.
3. Attack Schema
The fundamental structure of this attack is to localize a
victim using their aggregated TA information via whatever
prudent method of collection available and a MLE algo-
rithm. In a traditional LTE network, an antagonist would
1If µ = 0, the result is the expected legacy LTE Ts.
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place themselves advantageously to collect the information
over the open-air interface; however, the updates to the
physical layer in NR (ultra-densification, tight beamforming,
use of massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), etc)
have resulted in this being less than effective at the higher
SCSs and bands. In an ultra-dense environment, determining
which RRH is in communication with a target UE would
be non-trivial, and if found, positioning a sensor to receive
the UE uplink burst in mmWave communications would
require the sensor and receiving RRH to be nearly co-
linear, resulting in little to no extra positioning information
provided, greatly diminishing the motivation to use CeSAR
enhancement.
The CRAN architecture and discussed PLS has simply
shifted this vulnerability by maintaining the unencrypted
nature of the TA and passing it from the RRH to the
BBU along the fiber fronthaul. In fact, this may have made
the vulnerability worse as it allows for the possibility of
collection on the aggregated data as the target moves within
the environment.
3.1. CeSAR
As an addition to our standard attack method we will
implement the CeSAR method documented in [17], as a
passive enhancement to our localization technique. Though
this enhancement is ineffective in particular 5G use cases, as
described above, it is still entirely valid in NR environments
operating in sub 6GHz and LTE frequencies, as will be
the case in less densely populated locations. It involves the
placement of a secondary device to listen for the uplink burst
from the target UE to the RRH, creating another known
distance to further increase the localization fidelity. The
algorithm, as defined in [17] is detailed in Table 2.
4. Initial implementation
4.1. Comparative Analysis of Statistical Efficiency
To begin, we established the wireless architecture by
establishing the UE at [0,0] and then randomly distributing
4 RRHs within a 1 km x 1km area2. The true distances
from the RRH to the UE were calculated and introduced to
gaussian noise, forming our distance estimates, d̂i, which
were then quantized into their appropriate TAs. Utilizing
the known range values for each TA, we then found the
target’s position MLE, p̂, through the employment of the
Non-Linear Least Squares (NLLS) method presented in [18]
and [19]. This involves the minimization of x = [x, y]T in
the following





[di − ∥x − xi∥]2 (12)
where p̂ = [x̂, ŷ]T , di is the distance from each RRH to
the center of its TA ring, xi = [xi, yi]T are the positions of
2For clarity, the UE at [0,0] is the center point of this square area.
each RRH, and i is an integer ranging from 1 to the total
number of RRHs. From the solution to (12), the squared
distance error, error2d, is calculated squaring the distance
between p̂ and the true UE position p. Now that we have
established our positioning error for this trial, we find the
CRLB. Based on (11), we state that our mean squared error
(MSE) for the UE position estimate is bounded by
Var{p̂} ≥ I−1(x) (13)
where I , for the purpose of multilateration-based position


























and CRLB = tr(I−1) Once found, we compute the differ-
ence between our square error and the CRLB normalized





This procedure is then conducted one-hundred thousand
times for each numerology across values of σ ranging from
1 to 30. Finally the average ediffCRLB is found for each
value of σ.
Results
As seen in Figure 5, for each numerology the ediffCRLB,
provided in 15, approaches 0 as σ increases. The vertical
dotted lines show the expected approximate value of σ
where the MLE for each numerology meets the CRLB,
based on the theoretical bounding of r . 3.4σ, described
in Section 2.4. This theory is shown to be well founded as
each numerology performed as expected with µ = 0 ∶ 2 the
closest to this theoretical point of bounding, and µ = 3 ∶ 4
having slightly greater values of σ for which they converge
with the CRLB. This gives a baseline for values of σ that
will produce the most statistically efficient location estimate
based on the numerology chosen. Moving forward in this
paper, the remainder of the multilateration simulations take
this into account, using static values of noise variation, in
order to show the most accurate position estimates possible.
4.2. CeSAR Enhanced Localization
This portion of our investigation is dedicated to
determining the potential gains of the CeSAR algorithm
when used in conjunction with the NR numerologies, as
well as the effectiveness of localization in R3. To this
end, we first establish our RRH and UE deployment by
randomly distributing and selecting 4 RRHs and 1 UE
3As the CRLB changes each iteration based on the relative positions
of RRHs to the UE, normalizing by the CRLB is necessary to compare
across trials.
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TABLE 2: Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement [17]
Step Procedure Description
1 cesar (pRRH , psensor , target crnti) Passive enhancement procedure utilizing sensors, rrh’s and target crnti.
2 function PSS/SSS SYNC Primary and secondary search signal synchronization.
3 sensor ← rrh downlink Sensor listens for the PSS/SSS from serving rrh.
4 end function Steps 2-4 are necessary for synchronizing the sensor to the base station to allow it todecode cell data.
5 repeat Repeat steps 2-4 for each. rrh
6 x ← observed crnti Sensor will continue to decode packets.
7 until Sensor continues to search for target crnti.
8 x == target crnti The downlink frame being sent to the target ue has been identified.
9 d̂i ← ta × 78.125m The associated ta is stripped from the MAC CE and converted to a distance.
10 t ← ta estimate tx The TA is used to estimate the target ue’s uplink transmission time.
11 t′ ← observed observe uplink burst timing information from one of the N serving rrhs.
12 ∆t← t′ − t Utilizes information from step 10 to measure the propagation delay from the ue to thesensor.
13 d̂′ = ∆t × c Convert to a distance measurement.
14 d̂← [d̂, ..., d̂N , d̂′]T Additional distance measurement is added to the distance measurement obtained fromthe N serving rrhs.
15 p̂ = arg min p(d̂∣d) Uses step 14 to find a mle via previously discussed means.
16 end procedure END
Figure 5: Difference between square error and CRLB for
each SCS across σ values.
each with randomly determined heights. Next, we follow
a similar procedure to our standard implementation in the
previous section for finding the MLE, particularly solving
(12), without CeSAR enhancement, selecting σ values
consistent with meeting the CRLB for each numerology.
Next, we enhance the previous findings by adding a
singular CeSAR sensor. This is done in the same method
established in Table 2. For simulation purposes, the CeSAR
sensor is randomly placed in the environment, steps 1-13
are assumed to have been completed, and we utilize the
true distance measurement between the sensor and UE.
This distance is combined with the RRH measurements,
and the enhanced MLE is calculated as before. The above
procedure was then completed five-hundred thousand times
for each numerology.
Figure 6: CDFs for both standard and CeSAR implementa-
tions for µ = 0 and µ = 4 respectively.
Results
The cumulative distribution function (CDF)s for the
lowest and highest SCSs are shown in Figure 6, with the
results for a circular error probable (EP) of 90% and 95%
for all SCSs are displayed in Table 3. CEP4 [20] relates
the location distance error and confidence location error,
by creating a ring of precision around a target, in which a
chosen percentage of location estimates are contained (90%
and 95% respectively), where the radius is equal to the
furthest location distance error among those contained points
(see Figure 7)
A brief viewing of the above conveys the CeSAR al-
gorithm’s marked increase in positional accuracy for each
numerology. A deeper look at Table 3, reveals that at its
4CEP 90%: Pr[∥p̂ − p∥2 < C] = 0.9.
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worst, the algorithm increases position fidelity by ≈ 20%
(see µ = 0) and ≈ 40% (see µ = 4) at its best, either of
which are considered significant. These results support the
use of CeSAR as an augmentation for TA-based localization
attacks in 5G NR.
5. Realization in Kauai
The final portion of our paper presents a simulation of
our localization attack on an unsuspecting HICSS attendee.
This will be broken into two separate wireless architectures
(displayed in Figures 7 and 8), the former being a real-world
setup, the latter being a vision of the future ultra-dense (UD)
5G deployment. This split is based on the different use cases
for the various numerologies. For the real-world type, the
singular RRH is an operational 5G tower, the locations of
the CeSAR sensors were chosen based on topography and
angle from targets projected position and numerologies 0-2
will be utilized based on distance to the closest RRH5. The
UD deployment is somewhat arbitrary, with an emphasis
on attempting to have near constant line-of-sight conditions
within the observable area to simulate a mmWave enabled
UD system.
For increased realism, the UE, RRHs, and CeSAR sen-
sors were first plotted in Google Earth to obtain global
positioning system (GPS) coordinates. These positions were
then converted to their values in meters. The real-world
deployment was then run through the CeSAR enhanced
algorithm to find the distance resolutions for µ = 0 through
µ = 2, while the UD deployment is run through our standard
algorithm. The reason for not running the latter through
CeSAR enhancement is the low liklihood of being able to
properly position a sensor in order to pick up the mmWave
communications without already having a solid estimate
of the target’s position, due to mmWave communications’
extremely small beam-width and controlled directionality.
Once position estimates in meters are obtained we con-
vert back to latitude/longitude.
This procedure is repeated numerous times so that an
average of the returned GPS coordinates can be taken to
find our MLE of the target’s position. For our procedure we
ran the simulation ten times, one-hundred times, and one
thousand times, and found that, though increased number of
runs also increases the position estimate accuracy, it does so
minimally. This coupled with the fact that run-time is also
a major constraint of localization attacks, given that a target
TABLE 3: EPs across each numerology in NR.
µ Standard CeSAR enhanced
EP = 90% EP = 95% EP = 90% EP = 95%
0 150.42 190.38 121.47 150.39
1 86.68 112.60 65.35 81.84
2 47.41 62.93 34.17 43.08
3 25.12 34.06 17.45 22.11
4 13.00 18.02 8.87 11.28
5≈ 2.96km which is not conducive to mmWave communications
could move during computation, we chose 100 runs as our
optimal trade-off between accuracy and run-time.
Results
For the real-world deployment the average MLE error
for the applicable numerologies were 30.12m, 12.36m, and
5.40m, while for the UD they were 8.64m and 4.02m
respectively. The final location estimates are showcased in
Figure 9, where the cyan markers are from the real-world
system and the pink markers from the UD system. The
cyan markers placement is interesting in that each one is
placed nearly linear and equal distances apart starting from
the µ = 0 marker. We speculate this is entirely due to the the
two CeSAR sensors distance estimates’ lack of dependence
on noise as well as their placement in the environment. The
UD errors were in keeping with findings for µ = 3 and µ = 4
errors in a previous study [21].
6. Mitigation Techniques
NR’s much lauded increase in physical layer secu-
rity through massive MIMO, heterogenous networks, tight
beamforming, and directionality is highly effective as is
for combating the effectiveness of the CeSAR algorithm.
CeSAR’s necessity to receive the UE’s uplink burst in
order to estimate distance becomes an extremely challeng-
ing, and likely inconsistent, task in 5G networks operating
in mmWave bands. Those operating below this, however,
without the protection afforded by the extremely thin beams,
will still be vulnerable.
Overall this attack is reliant on two portions of the
network:
1) TA commands being sent in the clear
2) CRAN fronthaul fiber network
and thus these are the most logical places to mount a
defense.
In dealing with the unencrypted TA the only adequate
method of security would be to encrypt it. Further efforts
at obfuscation, as was the case with the cell-radio network
temporary identifier (C-RNTI), do not solve the underlying
problem. That being said, encrypting the TA would result
in increased latency and increased bandwidth requirements.
Increasing latency for timing management could be a non-
starter for many working towards the ultra-low latency
communications that 5G has the potential to offer. To this
we suggest a tailored approach, where the end user or a
particular application can choose between the added security
or the added utility. The CRAN’s fiber fronthaul offsets
any of the increased physical-layer security measures listed
above, as it aggregates the data from potentially thousands
of RRHs within a serviceable area to a centralized source,
increasing the risk of an adversary collecting data across
a much larger area. Without first addressing the issue of
encryption, the CRAN architecture as discussed here is a
security concern.
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Figure 7: Real-world deployment on Kauai
Figure 8: UD deployment on Kauai
7. Closing Remarks
We have shown through our investigation that by utiliz-
ing aggregated unencrypted TA commands we can calculate
statistically efficient location estimates, with some accurate
down to ≈ 4 meters. We have shown that these estimates
can be further enhanced using the CeSAR algorithm, and
brought to life a vision of what this attack could produce in
the real world. However, we have yet to answer our final and
most important question posed in the very beginning, ”Who
cares?” This answer is decidedly split between those who
believe that the benefits provided by advances and services
Figure 9: Position estimates for HICSS attendee
are worth the loss in privacy required to make use of them,
and those that would do without in order to maintain their
sense of privacy. Where these two converge though is around
their ability to make a choice, on whether to give up their
privacy at all. However, we have shown that regardless of
choice, end users’ location data is vulnerable. Hearkening
back to Professor Westin’s definition of privacy, we argue
that, as long as this vulnerability exists, we do not have
a claim to location privacy. To this we will answer a new
question, ”Who should care?”: everyone.
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CRLB Cramér-Rao Lower Bound
CeSAR Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement
HICSS Hawaii International Conference on System Sci-
ences
CRAN Cloud Radio Access Network
TA timing advance
IoT Internet of Things
LBS location based services
D2D device-to-device
UE user equipment
FCC Federal Communications Commission
E-911 enhanced-911
ToA time of arrival
RSS received signal strength
AoA angle of arrival
RAN radio access network
BBU baseband unit
RRH remote radio head
CPRI common public radio interface
MIMO multiple-input multiple-output
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
5GPP 5G Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership
eCPRI enhanced CPRI
PLS physical layer split
NR New Radio
CP Cyclic Prefix
TAG Timing Advance Group
MLE maximum likelihood estimate
C-RNTIcell-radio network temporary identifier
RMSE root mean square error
NLLS Non-Linear Least Squares
MSE mean squared error
CDF cumulative distribution function
EP circular error probable
RW real-world
UD ultra-dense
GPS global positioning system
5G Fifth Generation
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